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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
MARY MUNNS, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
LOWELL SHELLEY MUNNS, 
Defendant/Respondent 
: No. 880585-CA 
: CATEGORY NO. 14(b) 
JURISDICTION OF COURT OF APPEALS 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear 
this appeal based on Utah Code Annotated section 
78-2a-3(2)(h), which grants to the Utah Court of Appeals 
appellate jurisdiction over "appeals from District Court 
involving domestic relations cases ..." 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from the final findings of fact and 
conclusions of law and absolute decree of divorce entered by 
the First Judicial District Court, Box Elder County; 
specifically the trial court's rulings concerning failure to 
award attorney's fees, the amount of alimony and the length 
of time alimony is payable, and the amount and nature of 
property distribution of the assets of the marriage. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Did the Trial Court abuse its discretion when 
it failed to award plaintiff her attorney's fees from 
1 
defendant 3 when her only liquid assets were an award of 
total child support of $394.00 per month and an alimony 
award of $300.00 per month? 
2. Did the Trial Court abuse its discretion when 
it awarded alimony in the amount of $300.00 per month to 
terminate when the plaintiff reached the age of 62, (within 
three years of the date of the decree), when the term of the 
marriage was in excess of 38 years, plaintiff has extremely 
limited employment skills, and the defendant has a career 
position paying him in excess of $27,000.00 per year? 
3. Was it an abuse of discretion for the Trial 
Court to award all property in kind, and not require that 
the properties be sold and the proceeds split between the 
parties or used to liquidate obligations of the marriage; to 
award to the defendant an oversized portion of the marital 
property, including all assets which could quickly be 
converted to cash; and to allow defendant a two-year period 
in which to pay to plaintiff the judgment representing the 
offsetting value of the properties? 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES 
ORDINANCES, AND RULES 
Utah Code Annotated Section 30-3-5(1) 
Utah Code Annotated Section 78-2a-3(2)(h). 
(Full text of each statute is included in the Addendum) 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case is an appeal from final findings of fact 
and conclusions of law, and an absolute decree of divorce, 
which adjudged the parties divorced, assigned custody of the 
minor children, established the amount of alimony and child 
support to be paid, and divided the marital property of the 
parties. Plaintiff appeals from the Judgment of the court 
concerning the issues of alimony, property distribution, and 
denial of attorneys fees. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
1. Plaintiff filed her complaint for divorce on 
July 31, 1986. (ROOD 
2. On September 23, 1986, defendant filed his 
answer and counterclaim.(R019) 
3. Plaintifffs reply to defendant's answer and 
counterclaim was filed on October 16, 1986.(R025) 
4. Plaintiff's Order to Show Cause was heard by 
the Court on September 22, 1986. At that time the Court 
awarded plaintiff the custody of the minor children of the 
marriage; temporary use of the home, along with household 
furnishings in her possession and her "motor vehicle" (which 
motor vehicle was not specified); $400.00 per month for 
temporary alimony; $168.00 per month per child for child 
support for a total of $504.00 as temporary child support 
3 
(there being three minor children at the time of the 
hearing). Plaintiff was ordered to make the monthly 
mortgage payment on the home and pay the utilities; 
defendant was to make all other monthly payments to keep the 
parties current. (R009, 052) 
5. The matter was tried to the Court on November 
24, 1987. At the close of testimony on that date, 
plaintiff's counsel moved to continue the case. The Court 
granted a continuance for the purpose of obtaining testimony 
regarding values of property only. The Court ordered that 
if defendant provided information to enable plaintiff to 
continue her insurance coverage in the meantime, the case 
would be bifurcated, with the divorce decree being granted 
and reserving property issues for further trial. 
6. By correspondence dated December 7, 1987, 
counsel for defendant submitted proof that plaintiff's 
health insurance could be carried over and continued 
following the entry of the divorce decree in this matter. 
Counsel for defendant also submitted proposed findings of 
fact, conclusions of law and a decree of divorce. (R131) 
7. Defendant's proposed findings of fact and 
conclusions of law were signed by the Court and entered on 
January 11, 1988, as was defendant's proposed decree of 
divorce. (R137 et seq.) 
8. On January 13, 1988, defendant gave notice to 
4 
plaintiff and her counsel of the entry of the findings of 
fact, conclusions of law, and decree. On January 19, 1988, 
counsel for plaintiff submitted an objection to the proposed 
findings, conclusions, and decree, and objected to the 
execution and entry of the same. Counsel for plaintiff also 
filed a Motion to vacate the proposed findings, conclusions, 
and decree, on the ground that the Court had never ruled on 
alimony, child support, or retirement. (R151, 155, 157, 159) 
9. A further hearing on property values was held 
on June 7, 1988, following which the Court issued its 
Memorandum Decision on August 1, 1988. In its Memorandum 
Decision, the Court adopted and affirmed the provisions of 
the findings, conclusions, and decree which were signed on 
January 11, 1988, with the exception of alimony, which was 
adjusted to $300.00 per month. The Court further established 
values on the properties of the parties, and divided the 
property in kind, giving plaintiff a judgment against the 
defendant in the amount of $9,000.00, to be paid in 2 equal 
installments over 2 years, to balance the property division. 
Following the court's memorandum decision, counsel for 
plaintiff prepared final findings of fact and conclusions of 
law and an absolute decree of divorce as ordered by the 
Court from the provisions in defendant's proposed findings, 
conclusions and decree and the memorandum decision issued by 
the Court. The Court executed the findings, conclusions, 
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and decree on September 8, 1988 , on which date they were 
entered by the Court. (R213-232) 
10. On October 11, 1988, following a legal 
holiday the preceding day, plaintiff, through her new 
counsel, filed her Notice of Appeal, and filed her bond for 
costs on appeal. Plaintiff/Appellantfs Docketing Statement 
was filed on November 1, 1988. 
DISPOSITION AT TRIAL COURT 
The ruling of the trial court was as follows: 
•1. Each party was granted a divorce from the 
other on the grounds of irreconcilable differences. (R140, 
145, 229) 
2. Plaintiff was granted custody of the two 
children who were still minors at the time of the Decree of 
Divorce. Based on the defendants income, child support was 
established at $197.00 per month per child. (R 138, 139, 
140, 145, 221, 224, 230) 
3. Defendant was employed full time at Morton 
Thiokol with an hourly wage of $13.90 per hour. ((R138) 
4. Plaintiff has not worked outside the home 
during the marriage but is capable of employment and had 
worked part time for the school district at approximately 
$3.50 per hour. (R138, 221) 
5. Defendant was ordered to provide health and 
accident insurance for the minor children of the marriage, 
6 
and continue life insurance on his life naming the minor 
children of the parties his beneficiaries; each party would 
be responsible for 1/2 of all medical expenses not covered 
by insurance; defendant was also ordered to cooperate in 
assisting plaintiff to retain her health and accident 
insurance through his employer through COBRA provisions. 
(R140, 141, 145, 1146, 221, 224, 230) 
6. The defendant had accumulated approximately 14 
years credit in the Morton Thiokol pension plan during the 
course of the marriage, which the Court apportioned one-half 
to each party. (R139, 221, 225, 231) 
7. The Court found that each of the parties had 
received some inheritance during the course of the marriage, 
but each inheritance had been expended or co-mingled with 
other marital assets and was unidentifiable. Therefore, the 
Court made no distribution of inheritance receipts to either 
party. (R 142, 222, 226, 232) 
8. The Court found that the plaintiff had 
incurred attorney's fees of approximately $1,700.00, a 
portion of which was paid from joint funds which were 
accrued during the marriage. The Court also determined that 
the defendant had incurred attorney's fees in excess of 
$2,000.00 in settlement negotiations, discovery, trial 
preparation and trial. The Court ordered each party to pay 
his or her own costs and attorney fees. (R 139, 142, 147, 
7 
226, 233) 
9. The Court established the values of the 
marital assets as follows: 
(a) The family home and lot, plus the lot east of 
the house, a total of 1.7 acres - $30,000.00 (mortgage of 
$3,162.00 equals net equity of $26,388.00). (b) Mobile home 
and lot in Bear River City - $26,000.00. (c) Building lot -
$11,000.00 (amount it sold for). (11/24/87 a.m. Trans, p.6) 
(d) Farm - $95,500.00 (mortgage of $46,953.00 yields net 
equity of $48,547.00). (e) Vehicles and machinery (exclusive 
of Chevrolet and Oldsmobile) (less outstanding loans) 
$23,859.00. (f) Junk and scrap metal - $10,000.00. (g) 
Household furnishings - $3,000.00. (h) Horses and livestock 
- $4,000.00. (i) Savings account - $3,200.00. (j) 
Chevrolet and Oldsmobile - $850.00. (R 215, 222-223) 
10. The Court set alimony at $300.00 per month 
based on nthe debts, the duration of payment, duration of 
the marriage, plaintiff's lack of work experience and 
employment skills, recognizing the ages of the children, the 
eventual receipt of social security and retirement benefits 
together with income realized from the properties". The 
Court ordered that defendant's obligation to pay alimony 
would end after the death of either party; would terminate 
upon remarriage of the plaintiff or cohabitation; would in 
any event terminate upon the plaintiff's 62nd birthday and 
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her eligibility to begin receiving Social Security payments. 
(R141, 146, 215, 223, 225, 231) 
11. The Court awarded to plaintiff the following 
property: the family home subject to the mortgage, mobile 
home and lot, building lot, Chevrolet and Oldsmobile, 
household furnishings, savings account and $9,000.00 
judgment against defendant to equalize distribution. (R 
216-217, 226, 232) 
12. Defendant was awarded the farm property 
subject to the mortgage; the vehicles and machinery subject 
to the debts, including the Bronco subject to the debt owed 
on it; junk and scrap; horses and livestock. Defendant was 
ordered to pay to plaintiff $4,500.00 within 12 months of 
the date of the findings and conclusions and decree, and the 
balance of $4,500.00 within one year thereafter. (R 216, 
217, 226, 232) 
13. Defendant was ordered to assume and discharge 
all debts and obligations of the parties with the exception 
of the mortgage on the family home. (R 217, 226, 233) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The parties to this appeal were married at 
Logan, Utah on June 2, 1950; they had been married for 38 
years at the time the Decree of Divorce was entered. Twelve 
children were born of the marriage, of whom eleven are still 
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living. Three children were minors at the time the divorce 
was filed; two of the children are still minors, and are in 
the custody of the plaintiff- (R 002, 020, 138, 221 9/22/86 
p. 4, 11/24/87 a.m. p. 12-13) 
2. Plaintiff was 57 years old at the initial 
hearing in 1986; by the time of trial she was 58 1/2 years 
old. (9/22/86 trans, p. 12, 11/24/87 a.m. trans, p. 84) 
3. Plaintiff has developed no marketable skills 
during the course of the marriage, and has not worked 
outside of the home during the marriage. (9/22/86 p. 4, 
11/24/87 a.m. p. 15-16) 
4. Since the beginning of divorce proceedings, 
plaintiff has been unable to obtain full time or even 
regular part time employment outside of the home, although 
she took a computer class, and applied for employment at Job 
Service, the school district, and several other places. The 
only employment she has obtained during the course of the 
proceedings was a substitute position in the school lunch 
program at a local junior high, which was only 3 to 4 hours 
per day when available. She has no expectation of being 
able to obtain a permanent job with the school lunch 
program. (R 138, 11/24/87 a.m. p. 101-102) 
5. Plaintiff has had a problem with her hands 
being numb, which required surgery; she has also had an 
ulcer since approximately 1981. Plaintiff suffers from some 
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loss of hearing, for which she is receiving medical 
treatment. She has moderate hearing loss in one ear, and 
severe hearing loss in the other ear, which requires that 
she wear a hearing aid in each ear. Each hearing aid must 
be replaced every five to seven years, and new ear mouldings 
must be made at the same time. Her hearing aids cost 
approximately $500.00, and batteries cost $3.00 to $4.00 for 
a battery pack which will last two weeks for each hearing 
aid. (9/22/86 trans, p. 3, 11/24/87 a.m. p. 49, 11/24/87 
a.m. p. 77 - 80.) 
6. Defendant is employed full time by Morton 
Thiokol. He has worked for this same company for over 14 
years. At the time the proceedings were begun, his hourly 
wage was $13.20 per hour; by the time of the final hearing, 
his income had risen to $13.97 per hour. During many years, 
he worked substantial over time. His 1987 total income, as 
evidenced by his tax returns, was $38,669.00. In 1986 his 
taxable income was $36,000.00; in 1985, it was $35,000.00. 
(R 138, 221, 11/24/87 a.m p.70, 11/24/87 p.m. p. 114, 133; 
6/7/88 trans, p. 2) 
7. Defendant is also self-employed in 
agriculture. His farm income for the total calendar year 
1985 was $7,000.00; his farm income for 1986 through 
September of that year was approximately $4,000.00; he did 
not provide to the plaintiff information concerning his farm 
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income for subsequent years. (R 062) 
8. Throughout the course of the marriage, 
defendant has continually acquired scrap metal, damaged or 
inoperable farm equipment, vehicles etc. which plaintiff 
generally describes throughout the proceedings as "junk". 
Based on receipts obtained by plaintiff, defendant purchased 
in excess of $21,000.00 in scrap metal from Morton Thiokol 
alone. (6/7/88 trans, p. 22-23, 6/7/88 ex. 1 p. 10) 
9. Plaintiff estimated her total monthly expenses 
in 1986 to be $1,190.00 per month. By the time of trial in 
November, 1987, plaintifffs expenses were $1,350.00 per 
month; even without the house payment, plaintiff would need 
a minimum of $1,090.00 income to meet her current 
expenditures. (R 014; 11/24/87 a.m. trans, p. 96-99) 
10. Plaintiff had incurred $1,700.00 attorneyfs 
fees through the time of trial, exclusive of court costs. 
With the additional hearing on June 7, 1988, plaintiff's 
attorney's fees totaled $2,000.00 plus costs. By the time 
of the final hearing, plaintiff had paid $475.00 in 
attorney's fees, leaving a balance of $1,525.00 plus court 
costs still owing to her counsel. (11/24/87 a.m. trans, p. 
83, 1/24/87 p.m. trans, p. 92; 6/7/88 p. 38-39 
11. By the date of trial, plaintiff's liquid 
assets had been reduced to a savings account with $100.00 to 
$200.00 in it, and a checking account with just in excess of 
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$300.00 (the minimum balance for that account). She had 
used the balance of her savings to pay bills. Defendant too 
had used some of his savings to pay bills, but still had his 
regular income from Morton Thiokol. (11/24/87 a.m. trans, p. 
83 - 84, 100-101, 11/24/87 p.m. trans, p. 134) 
12. Plaintiff inherited $11,336.90 in cash from 
her father, $3,000.00 at a rate of $1,000.00 per year for 3 
years prior to the death of plaintiff's father, $8,336.90 
following his death. (R -107, 108; 11/24/87 a.m. trans, p. 
58) 
13. Each time plaintiff received funds from her 
father or his estate, defendant requested to borrow the 
funds she had received in order to make payments which were 
due on various obligations, promising her that he would 
repay the funds with interest. Defendant has failed to 
repay any of the funds at any time, or to pay to plaintiff 
any interest. (11/24/87 a.m. trans, p. 59 - 60, 64, 67 -
68) 
14. Defendant inherited approximately 9 acres of 
property from his family. At the time of trial, the parties 
owned an unrecorded interest in 1 acre, which they had sold 
on contract for $11,000.00. The balance of the property had 
previously been sold by the defendant, and the proceeds used 
to purchase "junk", scrap metal and various implements 
and/or equipment which, by the time of the trial, generally 
13 
were inoperable and worthless except for their scrap value. 
(11/24/87 p.m. trans, p. 103 - 104, 11/24/87 a.m. trans, p. 
90) 
15. During the marriage the parties acquired a 
homestead at Elwood, consisting of a house on .82 acres, 
with an adjacent unimproved lot of .79 acres. This property 
was purchased from the defendant's father during the 
marriage, but not inherited. (R. 075, 11/24/87 a.m. trans, 
p. 89) The home is in poor to very poor condition, needing 
the following repairs: new carpets, new linoleum, replace 
the cabinets, paint the interior and exterior of the home, 
repair water damaged floor and window in kitchen, new sink 
and stove, new siding and shingles on exterior. (11/24/87 
p.m. trans, p. 10; 6/7/88 trans, p 12 -13; 6/7/88 ex. 1 p. 
7) Plaintiff's appraiser estimated repair costs to the 
exterior would amount to $4,688.00, while interior repair 
costs would amount to $6,943.00. (6/7/88 ex. 1 p. 7) The 
home was appraised at $23,000.00 by plaintiff's expert, Reed 
Willis. (6/7/88 ex. 1 p. 18) Defendant's expert, Troy 
Miller, a real estate broker, valued the Elwood house and 
property on the single lot of .82 acre at $32,000.00. 
Defendant valued the extra lot separately at $6,000.00. 
(11/24/87 p.m. trans, p. 6-7) At that same date, the Box 
Elder County Assessor's fair market value figure given for 
the home and both lots was $21,536.00. Defendant's expert 
14 
testified the assessorfs valuation was usually 10% of the 
resale value of the property. 
16. The parties also own a 1/2 acre lot with a 
double wide mobile home on it in Bear River City, Utah. 
Plaintifffs expert valued this lot and home at $23,500.00, 
stating that the roof and windows have water leaks and the 
carpets were only in fair condition. He estimated cost for 
repairs to bring the mobile home up to sale condition would 
be $1,900.00. (6/7/88 ex. 1, p 8, 18-19) Defendant's 
expert valued the same property at $26,000.00. (11/24/87 
p.m. trans, p. 7, 15) The parties had previously sold this 
parcel on contract for $24,000.00 plus a motorhome of 
unspecified value, with payments at the rate of $250.00 per 
month. However, the buyers had defaulted and it has been 
necessary for the parties to retake this property and resell 
it. (9/22/86 trans, p. 20) 
17. The parties own 2 parcels of agricultural 
property, of 154 acres and 148.6 acres respectively. The 
property has been used as pasturage by the defendant for 
many years, for his own livestock and that of others. The 
grass, when cut, also generates income for the parties. 
(11/24/87 p.m. trans, p. 160 - 161) Defendant has the right 
to use water associated with the property, but does not 
actually own water shares for the property; cost to him to 
purchase such shares would be $9,810.00, and he would have 
15 
to purchase such shares before he could sell the property. 
(6/7/88 trans, p. 20, 6/7/88 ex. 1 p. 10) Plaintifffs 
expert, Reed Willis, valued this farm property at 
$122,500.00 less the amount required to buy the water 
shares, for a net value of the farm property of $112,690.00. 
(6/7/88 trans, p. 20) Defendant valued the entire parcel of 
agricultural property at $250.00 per acre, yielding a value 
for both parcels of just over $75,000.00. (11/24/87 p.m. 
trans, p. 96- 97) Defendant's valuation was based on 
purchases by Carl Hansen and Curtis Christensen of parcels 
next to the Munns properties, IA. Both purchases were from 
the Federal Land Bank, of properties under foreclosure, and 
were made by sealed bid rather that a hands off-market sale. 
(11/24/87 trans, pp. 50 - 52, 65 - 67) 
18. Defendant claimed that all the household 
furniture and furnishings together were worth $5,000.00. 
(11/24/87 p.m. trans, p. 105) Plaintiff stated that most of 
the furniture in the home was in nlousy,! condition, and that 
her intention was to give it away. Most of the furniture 
was second-hand. She valued the furniture at $100.00. 
Some individual appliances which she had replaced were 
valued separately: the washer, the refrigerator, the 
microwave. All other appliances she valued as worthless. 
(11/24/87 a.m. trans, p.p. 52-53) Plaintiff's expert, Reed 
Willis, in his appraisal (6/7/88 ex. 1 p. 7) stated nthe 
16 
furniture was in poor condition and would have no garage 
sale value except for a 1982 refrigerator and 1980 microwave 
oven". He valued the entire household furnishings at 
$390.00. 
19. The assets of the parties acquired during the 
marriage also include vehicles and machinery, junk and scrap 
metal, horses and livestock, savings account, Chevrolet, 
Oldsmobile, and Bronco. (R 002, 003) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
1. The attorney's fees incurred by the plaintiff 
were reasonable for the case, and for the time invested in 
the case. The evidence shows that plaintiff was in need of 
assistance in order to pay her attorney's fees. Therefore, 
it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to refuse 
to award plaintiff any of her attorney's fees. 
2. The amount of alimony awarded to plaintiff is 
insufficient to meet her ongoing expenses, considering her 
lack of income from any other source, and her inability to 
produce income. Defendant clearly has the ability to pay 
support to the plaintiff in an amount greater than that 
awarded. It was an abuse of discretion for the trial court 
to order that alimony would terminate completely when 
plaintiff reached age 62, without any consideration of the 
needs of the plaintiff following that time, or the ability 
of the defendant to provide continued support. 
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3. The trial court abused its discretion in 
allocating all property in kind, leaving the parties, and 
especially the plaintiff, in a cash-poor situation. The 
extreme difficulty in valuing the assets of the marriage 
resulted in an inequitable distribution of assets, awarding 
to defendant the majority of the assets which were readily 
convertible to cash. Allowing the defendant a two-year 
period in which to pay plaintiff the offsetting value of the 
marital assets leaves plaintiff in a financially vulnerable 
position, while there is no evidence to show that defendant 
was unable to pay the award at a faster rate. 
DETAIL OF THE ARGUMENT 
I. 
DID THE TRIAL COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT 
FAILED TO AWARD PLAINTIFF HER ATTORNEY'S FEES FROM 
DEFENDANT, WHEN HER ONLY LIQUID ASSETS WERE AN 
AWARD OF TOTAL CHILD SUPPORT OF $394.00 PER MONTH 
AND AN ALIMONY AWARD OF $300.00 PER MONTH? 
Plaintiff in this proceeding requested that the 
defendant be ordered to pay her reasonable attorney's fees 
and costs in prosecuting this action. The decision to make 
an award of attorney's fees traditionally rests within the 
sound discretion of the trial court. Kerr v. Kerr, 610 P.2d 
1380 (Utah 1980). Any award of attorney's fees must be 
based on both evidence of need and reasonableness of the 
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fees awarded. Kerr v. Kerr, supra; Beals v. Beals, 682 P.2d 
862 (Utah 1984); Huck v. Huck, 734 P.2d 417 (Utah 1986); 
Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331 (Utah App. 1988); Porco v. 
Porco, 752 P.2d 365 (Utah App. 1988); Maughan v. Maughan, 
102 Utah Adv. Rep. 44 (Ct. App. Feb. 22, 1989). The 
reasonableness of the fee to be awarded involves several 
factors, including the necessity of the number of hours 
dedicated to the case, the reasonableness of the rate 
charged by the attorney in light of the difficulty of the 
case and the result accomplished, and the rate commonly 
charged for divorce actions in the community. 
In the case at hand, counsel for plaintiff 
proffered testimony during the trial on November 24, 1987 
that a reasonable fee for services to that date would be 
$1,700.00 plus costs. (Tr. 11-24-87 - afternoon session, 
page 92). Counsel for defendant stipulated ffthat for the 
work done that is a reasonable amount". The testimony 
proffered by counsel for plaintiff at the subsequent hearing 
on June 7, 1988 (Tr. pages 38-39) indicated that plaintiff's 
attorney fees through that hearing were $2,000.00 plus 
costs, of which the plaintiff had paid only $475.00, leaving 
a balance owing on her attorney's fees of $1,525.00. 
The record is replete with evidence that the 
plaintiff is in dire need of financial assistance with her 
attorney's fees. She has no income other than the funds 
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received from the defendant for alimony and child support. 
She has no marketable skills and has not been employed 
outside the home since the marriage in 1950, except for a 
substitute, part-time position with the school district in 
the school lunch program at the minimal wage of $3.50 per 
hour. Plaintiff has no liquid assets, and the income 
available to her from defendant is barely enough to cover 
her living expenses and those of her minor children. 
Therefore, this case is very similar to Huck v. Huck, supra. 
In Huck, the court's award of partial attorney's fees to 
Mrs. Huck was upheld on the basis that she had no liquid 
assets and her income barely covered her expenses. (Since 
Mrs. Huck did not cross-appeal the partial award of 
attorney's fees, the court did not go on to consider whether 
she should have received her entire attorney's fees.) 
In the case at hand, the trial court gave no 
indication as to its exact reason for denying plaintiff any 
award of attorney's fees, other than to state that part of 
plaintiff's attorney's fees had been paid out of a joint 
bank account of the parties. However, this left a 
substantial balance owing to plaintiff's atttorney, and 
plaintiff has no source of funds with which to pay her 
attorney's fees. Defendant, on the other hand, has a steady 
source of income through his employment at Morton Thiokol. 
The fact that defendant had incurred attorney's fees in 
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excess of those incurred by plaintiff is irrelevant to the 
issue of whether plaintiff should be awarded attorney's 
fees; if anything, that fact merely goes to support the 
reasonableness of plaintiff's attorney fee claim. 
Defendant's counsel stipulated that the attorney fee claim 
by plaintiff was in fact reasonable for the work done in 
this case. Therefore, it was an abuse of discretion for the 
trial court to fail to award to plaintiff her attorney's 
fees and costs incurred in prosecuting this action. 
II. 
DID THE TRIAL COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT 
AWARDED ALIMONY IN THE AMOUNT OF $300.00 PER MONTH 
TO TERMINATE WHEN THE PLAINTIFF REACHED THE AGE OF 
62, (WITHIN THREE YEARS OF THE DATE OF THE 
DECREE), WHEN THE TERM OF THE MARRIAGE WAS IN 
EXCESS OF 38 YEARS, PLAINTIFF HAS EXTREMELY 
LIMITED EMPLOYMENT SKILLS, AND THE DEFENDANT HAS A 
CAREER POSITION PAYING HIM IN EXCESS OF $27,000.00 
PER YEAR? 
The purpose of alimony, as stated by both the Utah 
Supreme Court and the Utah Court of Appeals, is to Menable 
the receiving spouse to maintain as nearly as possible the 
standard of living enjoyed during the marriage and to 
prevent the spouse from becoming a public charge." Paffel 
v. Paffel, 732 P.2d 96, 100 (Utah 1986); Jones v. Jones, 700 
P.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah 1985); Naranjo v. Naranjo, 751 P.2d 
1144, 1146 (Utah App. 1988). Thus, the purpose of alimony 
goes beyond mere support of the spouse at the poverty level. 
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Rather, it should "to the extent possible, equalize the 
parties1 respective standards of living and maintain them at 
a level as close as possible to the standard of living 
enjoyed during the marriage." Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 
1076, 1081 (Utah 1988); Olson v. Olson, 704 P.2d 564, 566 
(Utah 1985); Jones v. Jones, supra; Higley v. Higley, 676 
P.2d 379, 381 (Utah 1983); Naranjo v. Naranjo, supra. 
In September, 1986, plaintiff's evidence was that 
her monthly expenses were $1,190.00. At that time, the 
Court awarded her $400.00 per month as temporary alimony, 
and temporary child support of $168.00 per month for each of 
the three minor children giving her a total temporary award 
of $904.00 per month. By the time of trial, plaintiff's 
monthly expenses were $1,350.00 per month, including her 
house payment of $259.00 per month. Between the time 
temporary alimony was initially set and the time of trial, 
one child had reached age 18, and plaintiff no longer 
received child support for him. However, her household 
expanses did not decrease as much as her income did when 
child support for that child was eliminated. The nature of 
many of plaintiff's household expenses is such that the 
amount required for those expenditures remains the same, 
whether they are made solely in behalf of plaintiff; in 
behalf of plaintiff and two minor children; or in behalf of 
plaintiff and three minor children. 
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During that same period of time, September 1986 to 
September 1988, defendant's income rose from $13.20 per hour 
to $13.97 per hour. However, the trial court, when it 
entered its final award of alimony, reduced the alimony from 
$400.00 per month to $300.00 per month, at a time when 
defendant's income had clearly increased and when child 
support previously received was being cut off as the 
children reached 18. 
A. Amount of Alimony Awarded. 
Analysis of an alimony award to determine whether 
it is reasonable involves three factors: 1) The financial 
condition and need of the party seeking alimony; 2) the 
ability of the party seeking alimony to produce income; and 
3) the ability of the other party to pay support. English 
v. English, 565 P.2d 409, 411-412 (Utah 1977); Jones v. 
Jones, supra; Olson v. Olson, supra; Paffel v. Paffel, 
supra; Gardner v. Gardner, supra; Naranjo v. Naranjo, supra. 
If the trial court has considered those three factors in 
making its alimony award, this court has stated that it will 
not disturb the award of the trial court unless "such a 
serious inequity has resulted as to manifest a clear abuse 
of discretion." English v. English, 565 P.2d 409, 410; 
Martinez v. Martinez, 754 P.2d 69, 74 (Utah App. 1988). A 
review of the evidence in light of those three factors, 
however, shows that there is a serious inequity in the 
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alimony award entered by the trial court below. 
1. Plaintiff's Financial Condition and Needs. 
The substance of plaintiff's testimony at trial 
was that her monthly expenses, exclusive of her house 
payment, were $1,090.00. Her house payment added $259.00 
per month to this figure. The Court awarded her $300.00 per 
month alimony, scarcely enough to pay the house payment. 
Between the time the divorce was entered and the time this 
brief was filed, the loan on the home was paid off. Even 
without the house payment, though, $300.00 per month is 
clearly inadequate to pay plaintiff's utilities, insurance, 
car expense, and her own personal expenses. 
Although the house payment has now been 
eliminated, the plaintiff still cannot support herself on 
the amount of alimony awarded. The Bear River property 
awarded to plaintiff is not currently producing income, and 
there is no finding concerning the amount of income it can 
be expected to produce on a regular basis. Even if the 
Court assumes that it can regularly produce $250.00 per 
month, as there was some evidence to indicate, plaintiff's 
income still falls short of meeting her expenses at this 
level of alimony. $300.00 alimony per month, with $197.00 
per child as child support, and $250.00 potential income 
from rental on the Bear River property, simply does not add 
up to the $1,090.00 required to meet plaintiff's current 
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expenses. Plaintiff should not be required to exhaust her 
capital assets to meet her current expenses (especially 
where those current expenses do not include payments for 
other capital assets). It is unlikely that she will be able 
to sell the Bear River property and convert the entire 
amount to cash. If she is able to sell it at all, she will 
have to sell it on contract, and she will not be able to get 
payments much in excess of $250.00 per month. 
Additionally, the testimony clearly shows that the 
home is in very poor condition and needs major repairs. 
Although there was evidence that repairing the home would 
cost approximately $11,600.00, the court did not provide to 
plaintiff any source of income to pay for those repairs. 
Plaintiff is not asking for sufficient funds to live in the 
lap of luxury. The parties have lived in a very small home 
(928 square feet on the main floor, and 464 square feet in 
the basement) for approximately 30 years. During that time, 
they have raised 11 children in that home. The effective 
age of the home according to the appraiser, is about 60 
years. (6-11-88, ex. 1 p. 7) Given these factors, it is 
understandable that the home needs major repairs, and 
plaintiff needs some source of income with which to effect 
repairs. 
2. The Ability of the Party Seeking Alimony to 
Produce a Sufficient Income for Herself. 
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The trial court in this case awarded to the 
plaintiff $300.00 per month as alimony, apparently intending 
that this amount could be supplemented by child support, and 
by income from another parcel of property of the parties 
which was awarded to the plaintiff. 
Plaintiff was awarded a double wide mobile home 
and lot in Bear River City, in which the parties were not 
living. They had previously sold this property on contract, 
but the buyers have defaulted. Even if the property can be 
rented for $250.00 to $300.00 per month, plaintiff does not 
have funds to make repairs necessary on the property (her 
appraiser estimated those repairs would cost approximately 
$1,900.00). The property has been listed for sale, but the 
best offer received since the decree of divorce was onLy 
$15,900.00. None of the other properties awarded to the 
plaintiff are income producing properties. 
Plaintiff is close to 60 years of age. Since 1950 
when the parties were married, she has been a housewife and 
mother, but has not worked outside the home. She has 
developed no marketable skills. She lives in a rural area 
where jobs are scarce, especially for those without training 
and experience. Although she has tried to obtain some job 
training and has applied for jobs throughout the area, the 
only employment she has had since the beginning of divorce 
proceedings has been substitute in the school lunch program 
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in the local middle school. This job is only part time, and 
she has only been able to work at irregular times. She has 
no immediate prospects of being hired on a regular basis for 
this job. MIt is entirely unrealistic to assume that a 
woman in her mid-50fs with no substantial work experience or 
training will be able to enter the job market and support 
herself in anything even resembling the style in which the 
couple had been living." Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1075; 
Naranjo, 751 P.2d 1144, 1147. It is unrealistic to expect 
that plaintiff will be able to become employed at such a 
wage level that she can make up the difference between her 
income and her expenses. While the Court did not state that 
it was assuming she would become employed, nor did the court 
set a level at which it expected her to produce income, that 
seems to be the result of the court's ruling. 
Plaintiff has no prospect of being able to produce 
income sufficient to meet her current expenses, much less 
sufficient to enable her to make necessary repairs to her 
own home. In the case of Gardner v. Gardner, supra, the 
Utah Supreme Court reversed and remanded an alimony award 
for specific findings concerning the wife's ability to 
support herself. In that case, the trial court had awarded 
the wife $1,200.00 per month as alimony, although there was 
evidence that her monthly needs were $1,700.00 per month. 
Mrs. Gardner had not been gainfully employed since 1958, and 
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the court gave no indication as to the basis for its award 
of $1,200.00 per month alimony. Since her future earning 
potential was nil, and her current monthly expenses exceeded 
the alimony award, the court considered that the award was 
insufficient to equalize the standards of living of the 
parties. 
Likewise, in this case, the court gave no specific 
monetary basis for its award of alimony. The court did not 
specify what amount of income, if any, was projected to be 
produced by the properties; nor did the court state whether 
it was assuming that plaintiff would be able to obtain some 
form of employment, and if so, at what wage. Without 
specific information from the court concerning the 
anticipated sources of income to the plaintiff, she will not 
in the future be able to show a substantial change in 
circumstances in order to modify the alimony award. 
Findings of the court concerning the plaintiff?s ability to 
produce income for herself are inadequate. 
In the case of Higley v. Higley, supra, the trial 
court awarded to the wife $100.00 per month as permanent 
alimony. Higley involved a 30 year marriage, where the 
wife was 47 years of age, in poor physical health, and with 
no employment training or experience other that na few 
sporadic, seasonal, unskilled jobs.11 The level of alimony 
awarded in Higley was clearly not sufficient to allow the 
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wife to enjoy a standard of living anywhere near that which 
she had enjoyed during the marriage or near the standard of 
living the husband would enjoy following the divorce. The 
court noted that the alimony was so low she could be forced 
to resort to public assistance, which would fail to meet the 
most important purpose of alimony, to prevent the spouse 
from becoming a public charge. Likewise, if the plaintiff 
does not have the ability to produce sufficient income to 
supplement the permanent alimony award to a level whch will 
meet her reasonable expenses, this court must reverse and 
remand to the trial court for entry of an award of permanent 
alimony at a level sufficient to enable her to pay her 
monthly obligations. 
3. The Ability of the Other Spouse to Pay 
Support. 
Obviously, the court must take into account in 
establishing alimony the ability of the paying spouse to 
provide support. However, the evidence does not support the 
trial court's findings in this area. By the time of the 
final hearing on this case, the defendant was earning $13.97 
per hour at his full time employment at Morton Thiokol, 
yielding a gross income per month from that job alone of 
$2,402.84. Defendant was able to work overtime at the job, 
and has frequently done so in the past. The defendant also 
has income from the agricultural properties of the parties, 
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which can offset a portion of his payments. During the 
course of the proceedigns, defendant's income rose, while 
his expenses for child support decreased. He has since paid 
off his Bronco5 further reducing his expenses. 
Plaintiff throughout these proceedings has 
requested alimony of $850.00 per month. She feels that this 
amount is sufficient to enable her to meet her regular 
expenditures, and maintain the lifestyle she had prior to 
the divorce. Awarding plaintiff $850.00 per month as 
alimony would very nearly equalize the parties' standard of 
living. While defendant's debt load is heavy, he also 
received numerous items of property in the divorce which 
could be used to generate income to reduce his debt load. 
If he chooses to retain those assets instead of converting 
them to cash, he cannot be heard to complain concering his 
heavy debt load, and the plaintiff should not be penalized 
for his unwillingness to convert assets to reduce his own 
payments. In Naranjo, this court upheld an alimony award of 
$800.00 to a 59-year-old wife who had worked as a full time 
homemaker for 16 years. That alimony award was slightly 
more than 1/3 of the husband's monthly income, and was not 
considered an unreasonable distribution. In support of that 
award, the Court stated "where a marriage is of long 
duration and the earning capacity greatly exceeds that of 
the other ... it is appropriate to order alimony ... at a 
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level which will insure that the supported spouse . . . may 
maintain a standard of living not unduly disproportionate to 
that which she would have enjoyed had the marriage 
continued." Naranjo, 751 P.2d 1144, 1147, quoting Savage v. 
Savage, 658 P.2d 1201, 1205 (Utah 1983). 
Based on an analysis of the three factors involved 
in alimony, the trial court's award of $300.00 is clearly 
inadequate, and is an abuse of discretion. It fails to meet 
the stated purpose of alimony, in that it does not provide 
plaintiff with a level of income sufficient to maintain her 
standard of living. It is questionable whether it provides 
her with a level of income sufficient to keep her from 
becoming a public charge. Plaintiff's expenses clearly 
exceed the amount awarded to her by the court and any amount 
she has a reasonable expectation of producing as income. 
Defendant's current income on the other hand, is clearly 
adequate to support her at the level she originally 
requested. The court's award of permanent alimony, which 
fails under any of the articulated standards, and fails the 
standard as a whole, is so clearly inadequate as to 
constitute an abuse of discretion, and the award must be 
increased. 
B. Alimony should not terminate at age 62. 
The trial court's order regarding alimony 
contained the usual provisions concerning termination of 
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alimony on the death of either party, remarriage of 
plaintiff, or her cohabitation with a member of the opposite 
sex. However, the Court went further, stating "said 
obligation in any event shall terminate upon the plaintifffs 
62nd birthday and her eligibility to begin receiving Social 
Security payments.ff (R. page 141, 146, 225, and 231) There 
is no indication in the record, however, as to how much the 
plaintiff may expect to receive in the way of Social 
Security payments. An estimate obtained by plaintiff shows 
that she can expect to receive only $204.00 per month as 
Social Security payments. (A copy of this estimate is 
included in the Addendum) There is also no independent 
analysis of this post-retirement alimony figure in light of 
the Jones factors: specifically, there is no indication 
that the plaintiff's expenses will drop, that her financial 
condition and needs will improve, or that her ability to 
produce income will improve. The Court took no step to 
protect the plaintiff should her income from Social Security 
be less than the amount of alimony she was awarded; nor did 
the court attempt to provide for a balancing of plaintiff's 
needs versus her income from Social Security in the future. 
Further, the court failed to tie any potential 
reduction in the plaintiff's income to an actual reduction 
in defendant's income. If defendant does not retire at age 
62, his income will not change, and there is no reason why 
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her income should drop if his does not. 
Even after retirement, the purpose of alimony is 
still to equalize the parties' standard of living. The case 
of Gardner v. Gardner, supra, is substantially similar on 
this point. In that case, the trial court cut alimony in 
half effective with the date of the husband's retirement. 
The trial court did not assess this cut in light of the 
wife's needs following retirement, nor in light of the 
husband's income following retirement. It was clear that 
the award of the trial court would be insufficient to 
equalize the standard of living for the parties following 
Dr. Gardner's retirement, and the case was reversed and 
remanded. The court in Gardner noted the likelihood of the 
wife's providing for her own retirement was small. She had 
no independent pension and would not qualify for social 
security only as an ex-wife married for the requisite number 
of years. Accordingly, the Supreme Court required the trial 
court to enter explicit findings concerning whether the wife 
would be able to meet her monthly needs with that award of 
post-retirement alimony. 
Likewise, there is no evidence in the case at bar 
to show that the plaintiff will be able to meet her needs 
after she reaches the age of 62. Mrs. Munns' s expenses are 
not expected to go down merely because she reaches the age 
of 62; the Court took no action to insure that her income 
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would remain at a level sufficient to meet her ongoing 
expenses. 
The provision of the Court's award terminating 
alimony at age 62 when plaintiff is eligible to receive 
Social Security benefits should be reversed, and the case 
remanded to the trial court with instructions to strike the 
provision altogether. Alternatively, the order should be 
reversed and the case remanded to the trial court for entry 
of an order sufficient to preserve Mrs. Munnsf income 
following age 62 at a level which will still enable her to 
meet her ongoing expenses, and to equalize the standard of 
living of the parties following defendant's retirement. 
III. 
WAS IT AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION FOR THE COURT TO 
AWARD ALL PROPERTY IN KIND, AND NOT REQUIRE THAT 
THE PROPERTIES BE SOLD AND THE PROCEEDS SPLIT 
BETWEEN THE PARTIES OR USED TO LIQUIDATE 
OBLIGATIONS OF THE MARRIAGE; TO AWARD TO THE 
DEFENDANT AN OVERSIZED PORTION OF THE MARITAL 
PROPERTY, INCLUDING ALL ASSETS WHICH COULD QUICKLY 
BE CONVERTED TO CASH; AND TO ALLOW DEFENDANT A 
TWO-YEAR PERIOD IN WHICH TO PAY TO PLAINTIFF THE 
JUDGMENT REPRESENTING THE OFFSETTING VALUE OF THE 
PROPERTIES? 
Utah Code Annotated Section 30-3-5(1) states3 in 
part, "...when a decree of divorce is rendered, the Court 
may include in it equitable orders relating to the children, 
property3 and parties.M 
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This Court has stated that "the purpose of 
property divisions is to allocate property in the manner 
which best serves the needs of the parties and best permits 
them to pursue their separate lives.ff Noble v. Noble, 761 
P.2d 1369, 1373 (Utah App. 1988), citing Burke v. Burke, 733 
P.2d 133, 135 (Utah 1987); Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 
1074-1075 (Utah 1985). The Court in Noble went on to state, 
"the overarching aim of a property division, and of the 
decree of which it and the alimony award are subsidiary 
parts, is to achieve a fair, just, and equitable result 
between the parties." Noble, 761 P.2d 1369, 1373. Both 
statute and case law refer repeatedly to "equitable orders", 
not to equal orders. The trial court, therefore, has 
considerable discretion in apportioning property and debts 
among the parties to a divorce. The decisions of the trial 
court will only be overturned on appeal if "... there was a 
misunderstanding or misapplication of the law resulting in 
substantial or prejudicial error; or the evidence clearly 
preponderated against the findings; or such a serious 
inequity has resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of 
discretion." English v. English, 565 P.2d 409, 410 (Utah 
1977) Accord, MacDonald v. MacDonald, 236 P.2d 1066, 120 
Utah 573 (1951); Naranjo v. Naranjo, supra. The Utah 
Supreme Court has also stated that the duty of the trial 
court is to "make a distribution of property and income so 
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that the parties may readjust their lives to their new 
circumstances as well as possible.11 Gardner v. Gardner, 748 
P.2d 1076, 1078. Obviously, in order to meet this goal, the 
trial court must have considerable flexibility in its 
distributions. 
The trial court in this case has carefully crafted 
a property distribution plan which appears to benefit the 
parties equally. However, the court's careful plan, 
especially when viewed in conjunction with its alimony 
award, allows the defendant to readjust his life to his new 
circumstances with scarcely a change. He continues to have 
his income from his job; he has all the property and items 
he needs to maintain his part-time avocation in farming; he 
even retains the scrap metal, junk cars, farm implements, 
etc. that he has collected throughout the marriage at the 
expense of his family's comfort. 
The plaintiff, on the other hand, is left with the 
home in which she has been residing (a home in need of 
extensive repair), and an additional residential property 
for which she has no use and for which she can not obtain 
the appraised value at a market sale. She must either sell 
this property at a loss, given the valuation placed on it by 
the court, or she must maintain it as rental property and 
become a permanent landlord. To maintain both these 
properties, she has very little income, not enough to 
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maintain her own current expenses, much less make capital 
repairs. She has almost no income, and no options; she must 
eke out an existence where she is surrounded by reminders of 
this failed marriage. Defendant, having had the services of 
the plaintiff for over 35 years, having resided with 
plaintiff and their eleven children in the same very small 
house for over thirty years, now walks away from the 
marriage with everthing he asked, his only obligations being 
the child support established by the schedule in effect in 
the trial court at the time of the divorce trial, and a 
meager alimony obligation. 
This court has articulated several factors which 
should be considered by a trial court when it allocates 
properties and debts. Those factors include the amount and 
kind of property to be divided, the source of the property, 
the parties' health, the parties' standard of living and 
respective financial conditions, their needs and earning 
capacities, the duration of the marriage, what the parties 
gave up by the marriage, and the relationship the property 
division has with the amount of alimony awarded. Burke v. 
Burke, supra; Naranjo v. Naranjo, supra. While the findings 
of fact issued by the court in this case recite that many of 
these factors were considered, the total result was in fact 
inequitable, and is an abuse of discretion. 
A. Was it an abuse of discretion for the court to award all 
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property in kind, and not require that the properties be 
sold and the proceeds split between the parties? 
The trial court in this case stated repeatedly 
that it was difficult to value the assets of the parties. 
Indeed, it was impossible for the parties to obtain 
competent appraisals on many of the items of property, real 
and personal. The only way to obtain an accurate valuation 
of many of the items was to sell them and then divide the 
proceeds. However, the defendant did not wish any of the 
property sold, and the court obliged by distributing all the 
property in kind. 
There were several items which could easily have 
been sold and the proceeds used to reduce the total debts of 
the parties, to generate cash for future living expenses, 
and to produce a source of funds which could be used to 
repair the properties which were not sold. Given the 
circumstances of the parties, and especially the cash-poor 
situation of the plaintiff, it was an abuse of discretion 
for the court to award all property in kind, without: 
ordering any of the properties to be sold, since the 
distribution gave plaintiff no assets which could easily be 
converted to cash. 
It is certainly not uncommon for a trial court to 
order the sale of properties of the marriage; in Gardner v. 
Gardner, supra, the trial court ordered basically all 
property to be sold except for household furnishings and 
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personal property (which were divided), and one personal 
automobile for each party. The court ordered the parties to 
sell all other real property, motor vehicles, boats, 
recreational vehicles, etc. 
A similar order in this case would have been more 
equitable to the parties. Defendant would still have had 
the option to retain any of the properties, provided he 
could pay to the plaintiff the reasonable value thereof or 
meet any sale price. Many items which were awarded to the 
defendant could have been sold readily and were not needed 
to continue to operate the farm. In particular, defendant 
had actually obtained a bid of $10,000.00 for the scrap 
metal. Defendant has not shown that he needed to maintain 
the entire amount of scrap metal to operate the farm, and 
sale of this asset would have generated funds for the 
parties to use in reducing their other obligations. 
Ordering sale of excess assets would generate income and 
also avoid the thorny problem of valuation. 
B. Did the Court abuse its discretion when it awarded an 
oversized portion of the marital property to the defendant, 
including all assets which could quickly be converted to 
cash? 
The court awarded the following items to the 
plaintiff: the family home and extra lot, mobile home and 
half acre lot in Bear River City; one acre building lot sold 
on contract; all household furnishings at the family home; 
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savings account at Morton Thiokol Credit union; Chevrolet 
and Oldsmobile. By the court's own figures, these assets 
were worth a total of $70,888.00, which together with the 
$95000.00 judgment awarded to the plaintiff yields a net to 
her of $795888.00 in the property distribution. 
Defendant, on the other hand received the 
following: farm of 302.6 acres; junk and scrap metal; horses 
and livestock; all other vehicles and machinery. Defendant-
received by the court's figures, $865406.00. When the 
$9,000.00 judgment against him is subtracted, his total from 
the property distribution is $77,406.00. While the figures 
appear to slightly favor the plaintiff, consideration of the 
circumstances of the parties reveals that the distribution 
is in fact inequitable, although it appears to be equal. 
There was considerable dispute considering the 
value of several of the properties of the parties, as 
follows: 
1. The family home, located on a lot of .82 acres 
with an adjoining lot of .79 acres, was valued by the court 
at $30,000.00. Plaintiff's expert witness, Reed Willis, 
valued the same property at $23,000.00, and indicated that 
substantial repairs were needed. His estimated cost of 
repairs was $11,600.00. Mr. Willis1 credentials as an 
appraisor were not challenged; in fact, the court indicated 
confidence in Mr. Willis's abilities. Defendant's expert, 
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Troy Miller, valued the home and one lot at $32,000.00. He 
indicated that the other lot would have a separate value. 
Mr. Miller has been more active as a real estate broker than 
an appraisor, and the court indicated at the end of the 
trial on November 24, that it was not satisfied with the 
competence of defendants expert witness. The trial court fs 
valuation of $30,000.00 comports with neither appraisal; nor 
does it allow any credit to plaintiff for the costs required 
to repair the home. Despite the evidence of defendant's 
expert, the more credible evidence showed clearly that the 
home in its current condition was worth considerably less 
than $30,000.00. 
2. The court valued the farm property at a total 
of $95,500.00. Defendant valued the property at $250.00 per 
acre, for a total value of $75,650.00, based solely on 
evidence of comparable sales next to his parcel. Both 
defendant's comparable sales were forced sales, where the 
buyer submitted the highest bid and was accepted. Both 
sales were for much smaller parcels of property than this 
farm property. Defendant made no effort to distinguish 
between different types of property, with different values, 
when he valued his total property at $250.00 per acre. 
Plaintiff's expert on the other hand, viewed the property 
site, reviewed soil records of the property, compared other 
comparable sales which were true market sales, and concluded 
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that the value of the 40 tilled and irrigated acres of 
property was $700.00 per acre; the value of the 262.5 acres 
of pasture land was $360.00 per acre, for a total value of 
$122,500.00. Plaintifffs expert then reduced this value by 
$9
 5 810.00 (the cost to the defendant to purchase water 
shares. Defendant has the right to use those water shares, 
and only needs to purchase the water shares if he decides to 
sell the property.) Even allowing a deduction for the value 
of the water shares, plaintifffs qualified expert valued the 
farm property at $112,690.00. The court gave no reason for 
appraising the property at a different value from the 
expert; rather, the court appears to have simply split the 
difference between the value placed on the property by the 
defendant and the value placed on the property by the 
plaintiff. 
3. The junk metal and scrap metal, including junk 
cars, inoperable farm equipment, etc., was valued by the 
court at $10,000.00. This was based solely on defendant's 
statement that Atlas Steel had made a bid of $10,000.00 for 
the lot. Plaintiff's expert, however, valued the Thiokol 
scrap metal and the junk vehicles separately, valuing the 
cars, trucks, and farm implements at $7,500.00. He did not 
place a value on the Thiokol scrap metal, other than the 
original purchase price of the scrap metal as communicated 
to him by the plaintiff. Plaintiff's records show that 
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defendant spent in excess of $20,000.00 purchasing scrap 
metal from Thiokol, and plaintiff believes that none of this 
scrap metal has been sold. If the court was not going to 
order that the scrap and junk metal be sold, there was 
certainly no need to rely solely on one bid to value such 
property. 
4. The household furnishings were assigned a 
value of $3,000.00. This may represent the replacement 
value; however, plaintiff's evidence, which was not disputed 
by the defendant, was that almost all furnishings in the 
home were in extremely poor condition, would have no resale 
value, and were of almost no value to the family. While 
defendant claimed that the household furnishings were worth 
a total of $5,000.00, he gave no evidence as to the 
condition of the household furnishings, their resale value, 
their age, or any other factor relevant to the value of 
those household furnishings. Plaintiff, on the other hand, 
was very specific in her assessment that most of the 
household furnishings were njunkff, which she would like to 
give away. Plaintiff did specify several items which would 
have some resale value: a washing machine, a refrigerator, 
and a microwave oven. These items, however, are not worth 
$3,000.00 all together. There was no evidence to support 
the court's finding that the household furnishings were 
worth $3,000.00 resale value. Even valuing the household 
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furnishings at $1,000.00 would probably have been to high. 
The court values on these four items alone have 
resulting in charging plaintiff with $9,000.00 more than she 
has actually received, $7,000.00 on the home and $2,000.00 
on household furnishings, while crediting defendant with 
$17,000.00 on the value of the farm, and an unknown amount 
on the value of the scrap metal. Based on these four items 
alone, plaintiff has in fact received only $71,000.00, while 
defendant has received $94,000.00. This is clearly 
inequitable in light of plaintiff?s commitment of her entire 
adult life to the marriage, to raising the children of the 
marrige, and to maintaining the properties of the parties. 
Further, a review of the exact items distributed 
to the parties shows that plaintiff has received properties 
which must be maintained, at net cost to herself, and are 
not easily converted to cash. Defendant, on the other hand, 
has received items which, with the exception of the farm 
property, can be converted to cash at his discretion. 
Defendant has already obtained one bid for the junk and 
scrap metal, and can sell that relatively easy. Based on 
the bid he has already received, he stands to gain in excess 
of $10,000.00 from the sale of the junk and scrap metal. It 
costs him nothing to maintain the junk metal until he 
decides to sell it, it can be sold in lots at different 
times if he so desires, and can generate funds with which to 
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liquidate outstanding debts or to provide operating capital 
for the farm as needed. While the farm property itself 
probably cannot be readily sold, it does generate some 
income through pasture rents, grass cuttings, etc. This 
income helps to offset the farm payments owed by defendant. 
Defendant also received rights to all horses and livestock. 
He has in the past sold some of these animals and can 
continue to do so as he desires , thus obtaining funds which 
he can apply as he sees fit and at the same time reducing 
his farm costs. Defendant was also awarded all vehicles and 
machinery except for the Chevrolet and the Oldsmobile. 
While some of these vehicles may not be operable , they may 
be repairable. Use of the vehicles enables defendant to 
produce income from the farm property, and some of the 
duplicate vehicles could be sold by defendant at his 
leisure. Since the market for used farm machinery is better 
than the market for new farm machinery, defendant may well 
be able to resell many of these vehicles. 
It is clear that the findings of the Court 
concerning the values of many of the assets of the parties 
is against the weight of the evidence; accordingly, the case 
must be reversed and remanded for an entry of property 
distribution more equitable to the parties. 
C. Did the Court abuse its discretion when it allowed 
defendant two years in which to pay to plaintiff the 
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offsetting value of the properties? 
The trial court awarded plaintiff a $9,000.00 
judgment against the defendant, payable at the rate of 
$4,500.00 within one year and another $4,500.00 payable by 
the end of the second year. As noted above, defendant has 
received most of the income producing properties, and most 
of the properties which can be converted to cash. Plaintiff 
has no income other than that derived from the defendant. 
The court-sanctioned delay in payment of the judgment leaves 
plaintiff with no source of funds for capital expenditures, 
no cushion of safety for unexpected expenses. Further, she 
loses some income which could accrue as interest during the 
course of the year if the judgment were payable at a faster 
rate. While the defendant does have major expenses, he does 
have several sources of income: his employment at Morton 
Thiokol, his income from the farm property, and assets which 
can be converted, all or part, to cash. He has now paid off 
the loan on his vehicle. It has not been shown that he 
cannot pay that judgment in less time than one year, much 
less two years. 
As the Utah Supreme Court noted in Gardner v. 
Gardner, Mthe purpose of divorce is to end marriage and 
allow the parties to make as much of a clean break from each 
other as is reasonably possible. An award of deferred 
compensation which ties a couple together long after divorce 
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can frustrate that objective/' 748 P.2d 1076, 1079. While 
the Court in that case was referring to deferred payment of 
retirement funds, the same principle obviously applies in 
this case. As the court noted in the same case, quoting 
Woodward v. Woodward, "long-term and deferred sharing of 
financial interests are obviously too susceptible to 
continued strife and hostility ...n Id. Given the hostility 
which exists between the parties to this case, a swift 
conclusion to all financial ties is desirable. 
Defendant in this case has not shown that it would 
work undue hardship on him to satisfy the judgment in less 
than two years. It may not be convenient for him, and 
perhaps he does not wish to sell some of the assets he has 
obtained in the divorce in order to obtain funds for this 
purpose, but he can maintain his normal lifestyle. Without 
speedy payment of the judgment, however, or other 
redistribution of assets, plaintiff is left with minimal 
cash reserves which will be speedily exhausted in the event 
of an emergency or in the event that she makes any of the 
many necessary repairs to the home. Plaintiff also looses 
the time value of the funds, if invested, and some of the 
repairs which she needs to make to the home may in fact cost 
more if the home is allowed to deteriorate for two years 
before she is able to obtain funds to make such repairs. 
Given the cash poor circumstances of the 
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plaintiff, it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court 
to grant to the defendant two years in which to pay to 
plaintiff the offsetting value of the properties. The trial 
court should be ordered to establish a more reasonable time 
table for payment of the judgment against defendant, to 
allow the parties to finally resolve their dispute and get 
on with their lives. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court abused its discretion in the 
following rulings: when it failed to order defendant to pay 
all or part of plaintifffs attorney's fees; when it awarded 
plaintiff only $300.00 per month as and for alimony, and 
ordered that all alimony would terminate at age 62; and when 
it distributed all the property of the parties in kind and 
allowed defendant two years in which to pay to plaintiff the 
offsetting value of the property distribution. Many of the 
values assigned to properties of the parties were against 
the weight of the evidence, resulting in an unequal and 
inequitable property distribution. 
Accordingly, the case should be reversed and 
remanded to the trial court for a more equitable order 
concerning the distribution of the assets of the parties, 
including an order that assets be sold where possible and 
the proceeds distributed to the parties, and an order that 
any judgment be paid to plaintiff as speedily as possible. 
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The amount of alimony should be reconsidered in light of all 
the factors of Jones v. Jones, supra, both before and after 
defendant's retirement. Since plaintiff has no liquid 
assets
 5 defendant should be ordered to pay all or part of 
her attorney's fees, both from the trial and on this appeal. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED This /Jjjf day of April, 
1989. 
KELLY G*. CARDON 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this /2^ day of April, 
1989, I mailed 4 true and correct copies of the above and 
foregoing Brief in the U.S. Mail, postage prepaid and 
addressed to the Attorney for Defendant/Respondent, Ben H. 
Hadfield, at P.O. Box F, Brigham City, Utah 84302. 
KELLY G. CARDON s 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
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ADDENDUM B 
Ben H. Hadfield of Mann, Hadfield & Thome #1288 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Zions Bank Building - 98 North Main 
P. 0. Box "F" 
Brigham City, Utah 34302-0906 
Telephone: 723-3404 
IN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT, BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MARY MUNNS, 
IvELL SE—LLEY 
DEFENDANT'S PRO^OS^"^ 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAN. 
CiTri~^  No ST^O'O1--^ 
:aan w. 
rial on 
the 24th day of November, 1987 beginning at the hour of 
10:00 o'clock a.m. and the plaintiff appearing in person and 
represented by her counsel of record, Pete N. Vlahos of the 
firm of Vlahos and Sharp and the defendant appearing in 
person and represented by his attorney, Ben H. Hadfield of 
the firm of Mann, Hadfield and Thome, and the court having 
heard the testimony of the parties, as well as numerous 
witnesses called in behalf of each of the parties and having 
received and reviewed numerous Exhibits and having announced 
from the bench that a further hearing would be held at the 
Numberf Vr^.V/-/5 
FILED 
JAN 11 TO -*> 
earliest possible date so as to receive additional evidence 
limited to the issues of the value of the farm property and 
the scrap metal and the court having previously announced 
its decision to bifurcate this trial so as to issue a 
decision and decree on all matters except the property 
division and debts, the court now enters the following 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law constituting the 
findings and decision of this court: 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
1. The plaintiff and the defendant were carried one ~o 
the ether on June 2, 1350 at Logan, Utah and have been 
rasidanoo of Box Zlder County, Utah for at laaoo inraa 
monrhs prior to the filing of one Complaint hereon. 
2. Twelve children have been born as iosua :f w e 
marriage, eleven cf which are living. Two of said children, 
Sharia :!unns born May 14, 1972 and Sheldon liunns born 
September 20, 1975 are minors. 
3. Irreconcilable differences exist between the 
parties. 
4. The defendant is employed full-time at 
Morton-Thiokol earning an hourly wage of $13.90 per hour. 
The plaintiff has not worked outside of the home during the 
marriage, but is capable of employment and has recently 
worked part-time for the School District at approximately 
$3.50 per hour. Based upon the defendant's income the 
Uniform Child Support Schedule indicates child support 
should be in the amount of $197.00 per month per child. 
5. The defendant is currently providing health and 
accident insurance to the plaintiff and minor children 
through his employment and additionally, has life insurance 
on his life naming the minor children of the parties as 
beneficiaries. 
6. The defendant has accumulated approximately 14 
years credit in the Morton-Thiokol, Inc. Pension Plan, v/hich 
credit was accrued during the course of the marriage. 
7. Each of the parties has received seme inheritance 
during the course of the marriage, which inheritances ac^ear 
to have been either expended or so ccmingiec wieh ether 
marital assets as to be unidentifiable. 
3. The plaintiff has incurred attorney's fees of 
approximately $1,70 0.0 0 and the defendant has incurred 
attorney's fees in excess of $2,000.00 in settlement 
negotiations, discovery, trial preparation and the trial of 
this action. A portion of the plaintiff's attorney's fees 
was paid from joint funds accrued during the marriage. 
9. The parties have acquired numerous items of real 
and personal property as well as numerous debts. A decision 
allocating property and debts shall be postponed until 
receipt of further evidence concerning valuation of the farm 
property and scrap metal. 
10. During the course of the marriage the parties have 
acquired an unrecorded interest in a one acre parcel located 
in Elwood, Utah. The parties have secured a purchaser for 
this property for the sum of approximately $11,000.00, and 
the parties have agreed that each of them should receive 
one-half of the proceeds from said sale after deduction of 
closing costs. 
AS CONCLUSIONS OF LAW FROM THE FOREGOING THE COURT 
CONCLUDES: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
1. Each cf the parties is entitled to a divorce fron 
tihe eerier uccn the crrounds of irreconcilable differences 
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2. CusuCdy of the miner children of the parties, 
Sharla Munr.s born May 14, 1972 and Sheldon Munns, born 
September 20, 1975 should be awarded to the plaintiff 
subject to reasonable rights of visitation by the defendant 
at reasonable times and upon reasonable notice. 
3. The defendant should pay child support to the 
plaintiff in the amount of $197.00 per month per child due 
and payable on the 1st day of each month commencing with tne 
month following the signing of the Decree. 
4. The defendant shall provide medical and health 
insurance on the minor children of the parties so long as 
such insurance is available to him through his place of 
employment. Each of the parties shall be responsible for 
one-half of any amounts not paid by the health insurance. 
In addition, the defendant shall be obligated to cooperate 
fully in assisting the plaintiff in obtaining continued 
health insurance coverage on herself pursuant to the Federal 
"COBRA" Statute. 
5. The defendant is ordered to maintain in effect the 
amount of life insurance provided by his employer as a 
fringe benefit, and to name the minor children of the 
under this paragraph will end and he will be released from 
the obligation of payment, after the death of either party. 
Said obligation shall likewise terminate upon the remarriage 
of plaintiff or her cohabitation with a member of the 
opposite sex. Said obligations shall in any event terminate 
upon the plaintiff's 6 2nd birthday and her eligibility to 
begin receiving Social Security payments. All payments made 
by the defendant under this paragraph shall be made in cash. 
7. The plaintiff is awarded a one-half interest in all 
retirement benefits accrued in the name of the defendant in 
the Morton-Thiokol, Inc . Pension Plan up to the date of 
November 24, 1987. Said interest shall be in accordance 
with the Woodward formula and the requirements of federal 
regulations governing pension plans. A separate "Qualified 
Domestic Relations Order" shall be prepared by plaintiff's 
counsel in conformance with federal requirements and 
"approved as to form" by defendant's counsel prior to 
signing by this court. 
8. Each of the parties shall pay their own attorney's 
fees and court costs incurred herein. 
10. The unrecorded interest in one acre located in 
Elwccd, Utah may be sold pursuant to the stipulation :: one 
parties, each party to receive one-half of the remaining 
proceeds after deduction of closing costs. 
11. The issues concerning division of real and 
personal property and allocation of responsibility for debts 
are reserved for additional evidence and further decision by 
this court. Until said further Order, the provisions 
concerning property and debts contained in the Temporary 
Order issued by the court in October, 198 6 shall remain in 
effect. 
12. The Decree of Divorce should become .final upon 
signing and entry. 
DATED this day of ^<L9Sj7. 
GORDON' J."TOW 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
ADDENDUM C 
Ben H. Hadfield of Mann, Hadfield & Thorne #12 88 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Zions Bank Building - 98 North Main 
P. 0. Eox "F" 
Brigham City, Utah 34302-0906 
Telephone: 723-3404 
IN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT, BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MARY MUNNS, 
DEFENDANT'S PROPOSED 
v_ -L V ^ a- _» C • o / Z U — w* ~ -r -
This natter having cone before the court for trial on 
the 2 4th day of Movember, 19 3 7 beginning at the hour of 
10:00 o'clock a.m. and the plaintiff appearing in person and 
represented by her counsel of record, Pete N. Vlahos of the 
firm of Vlahos and Sharp and the defendant appearing in 
person and represented by his attorney, Ben H. Hadfield of 
the firm of Mann, Hadfield and Thorne, and the court having 
heard the testimony of the parties, as well as numerous 
witnesses called in behalf of each of the parties and having 
received and reviewed numerous Exhibits and having announced 
from the bench that a further hearing would be held at the 
FILED 
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earliest possible date so as to receive additional evidence 
limited to the issues of the value of the farm property and 
the scrap metal and the court having previously announced 
its decision to bifurcate this trial so as to issue a 
decision and decree on all matters except the property 
division and debts, and the court having entered its 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Lav; and being fully 
familiar in the premises, now makes the following Order. 
Sharia Munns born May 14, 1972 and Sheldon Munns, born 
September 20, 1975 is awarded to the plaintiff subject to 
reasonable rights of visitation by the defendant at 
reasonable times and upon reasonable notice. 
3. The defendant shall pay child support to the 
plaintiff in the amount of $197.00 per month per child due 
and payable on the 1st day of each month commencing with the 
month following the signing of the Decree. 
4. The defendant shall provide medical and health 
insurance on the minor children of the parties so long as 
such insurance is available to him through his place of 
employment. Each of the parties shall be responsible for 
one-half of any amounts not paid by the health insurance. 
In addition, the defendant shall be obligated to cooperate 
fully in assisting the plaintiff in obtaining continued 
health insurance coverage on herself pursuant to the F3deral 
"COBRA" Statute, 
5. The defendant is ordered to maintain in effect the 
amount of life insurance provided by his employer as a 
fringe benefit, and to name the minor children of the 
parties as the beneficiaries of said insurance until such 
time as all children cf the parties have obtained majority. 
6. The defendant shall pay to the plaintiff as and fcr 
alimony or separate maintenance payments the sum c: 0 200.00 
per month commencing on the 15th day of the month following 
entry of the Decree and due and payable on the 13th day of 
each month thereafter. The defendant's obligation cc pay 
under this paragraph will end and he will be released from 
the obligation of payment, after the death of either party. 
Said obligation shall likewise terminate upon the remarriage 
of plaintiff or her cohabitation with a member of the 
opposite sex. Said obligations shall in any event terminate 
upon the plaintiff1s 62nd birthday and her eligibility to 
begin receiving Social Security payments. All payments made 
by the defendant under this paragraph shall be made in cash. 
7. The plaintiff is awarded a one-half interest in all 
retirement benefits accrued in the name of the defendant in 
the Morton-Thiokol, Inc. Pension Plan up to the date of 
November 24, 1987. Said interest shall be in accordance 
with the Woodward formula and the requirements of federal 
regulations governing pension plans. A separate "Qualified 
Domestic Relations Order11 shall be prepared by plaintiff fs 
counsel in conformance with federal requirements and 
"approved as to form" by defendant's counsel prior to 
signing by this court. 
3. Each of the parties shall pay their own attorney's 
"^.ocj Q^ r" cc'*'r** ccs^ ~3 incurred herein 
9. "either of the parties shall recei~:3 any separata 
claimed to have been received during the course of the 
rrarriace. 
13. The unrecorded interest in one a~,"v~-^  ^ cca4*0^ i^ 
Il'.vccd, Utah may be sold pursuant to the stipulation of the 
parties, each party to receive one-half of the remaining 
proceeds after deduction of closing costs. 
11. The issues concerning division of real and 
personal property and allocation of responsibility for debts 
are reserved for additional evidence and further decision by 
this court. Until said further Order, the provisions 
concerning property and debts contained in the Temporary 
Order issued by the court in October, 1986 shall remain in 
effect. 
12. The Decree of Divorce shall be and is final upon 
signing and entry. 
DATED this // day of C //JyWyJA y/,^^%- ) 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
ADDENDUM D 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, COUNTY OF BOX ELDER 
STATE OF UTAH 
MARY MUNNS, 
Plaintiff 
v. 
LOWELL SHELBY MUNNS, 
Defendant 
) MEMORANDUM DECISION 
* Civil No. 872020149 
This matter came on for trial before the Court on the 2 4th 
day of November 19 87. The plainriff did not rest and the matter 
was continued only for the purpose of obtaining further appraisals 
on the personal property (variously described as "junk") and upon 
the farm property. 
The parties were further instructed to present prooosed 
Findings of Fact. On January 11, 19 88, the plaintiff filed with 
the Court his proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and 
Decree. The plaintiff filed an objection thereto to which the 
defendant responded. The matter was back in Court on che 7th day 
of June for the taking of testimony and receipt of witnesses as to 
the values of the farm and personal property. 
With respect to the Proposed Findings and Decree which the 
Court signed the 11th day of January, 19 88, the plaintiff's 
objections are overruled and as to the alimony provision, the same 
is allowed to stand as the Court's decision. In that regard, the 
provision thereof fully reflects the Court's conclusions based upon 
the testimony and witnesses with the exception of Fthe:l.alimony 
i '• i ' i '" ^ ~ ""s 
p r o v i s i o n . The C o u r t f i n d s t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t h a s an incdme f i !5?e:b 
r u o c 11 ti c p\ J * 
Munns v. Munns 
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without overtime, of $2 4,029.40 per month. In light of the debts, 
the duration of the payments, the duration of the marriage, the 
plaintiff's lack of work experience and employment skills, recogn_; 
the ages of the children, the eventual receipt of social security 
and retirement benefits, together with income realized from the 
properties, the alimony is set at $300,00 per month rather than 
$200.00 per month as oreviouslv ordered. 
;Vj_c:: : ^ u a : : :he p r o p e r t y , t h e Cour t f i n d s t h e f o l l o w i n g 
. l u e s : 
Family Home (1.7 acres) $30,000.00 
lass mortgage - $ 3,162.00 $25,333.00 
Mobil Heme and Lot $26,000.00 
Building Lot $11,000.00 
Farm $95,500.00 
less mortgage - $46,953.00 $48,547.00 
Vehicles and Machinery $10,844.52 
less loans - $ 796.41 $23,859.00 
Junk and Scrap Metal $10,000.00 
Household Furnishings $ 3,000.00 
Horses and Livestock $ 4,000.00 
Savings $ 3,200.00 
Chevrolet and Oldsmobile $ 850.00 
Munns v. Munns 
Civil No. 872020149 
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THE DEBTS ARE AS FOLLOWS: 
Vehicles 
Bronco 
Farm Loans 
Mortgage (home) 
The property is divided as follows: 
TO THE PLAINTIFF 
Family Home (subject to mortgage) 
Mobil Home and Lot 
Building Lot 
Chevrolet and Oldsmobile 
Household furnishings 
Savings Account 
TO THE DEFENDANT 
Farm Property (subject 
Vehicles and Machinery 
Bronco (subject to the 
Junk and Scrap 
Horses and Livestock 
In order to equalize the distribution between the parties, the 
plaintiff is granted a judgment against the defendant in the sum cf 
$9,000.00 execution stayed thereon pending payment of $4,500.00 wirhin 
$10,844.52 
$ 796.41 
$46,953.56 
$ 3,612.35 
to mortgage) 
(subject to the debts) 
debt) 
=Hunns v. Munns 
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twelve months of this date and the balance of $4,500.00 to be 
paid within twelve months thereafter together with interest thereon 
at the judgment rate. Debts and obligations identified above are 
to be assumed by the defendant with the exception of the mortgage 
en the home which is to be the responsibility of the plaintiff. 
Each party to bear its own costs and fees. 
Counsel for plaintiff to prepare formal Decree and Findings, 
Dated this '.- - day of - Jts-ly, 19S3. 
Gordon J. Low 
District Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 1st day of August, 1988, I 
m-iled, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
Memorandum Decision to Pete N. Vlahos, Attorney for Plaintiff at 
the Legal Forum Building, 2447 Kiesel Avenue, Ogden, Utah 84401 
and to Ben H. Hadfield, Attorney for Defendant, at Zions Bank 
Building, 98 North Main, P.O. Box F, Brigham City, Utah 84302. 
Senior Court Cle^K/ 
ADDENDUM E 
PETE N. VLAHOSf #3337 
VLAHOS, SHARP, WIGHT & WALPOLE 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Legal Forum Building 
2447 Kiesel Avenue 
Ogden, Utah 8 4401 
Telephone: (801) 621-2464 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF EOX ELDER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MARY MUIINS, ) 
November, 19 87, before the Honorable Gordon 
Low, one of the Judges in the above-entitled Court, sitting 
without a jury, and Plaintiff not having rested his case for 
purposes of ascertaining the value of certain real property, 
and the matter having been continued until June 7, 1988, 
before the Honorable Gordon J. Low, for purposes of obtain-
ing further appraisals on personal property variously 
described as "junk", and upon the farm property, and the 
Court having further instructed the parties to present 
Proposed Findings of Fact, and the Defendant having 
Munn /s. Munns 
Civil No: 872020149 
presented Proposed Findings of Fact on January 11, 1983, 
along with Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce, and the 
Plaintiff having filed an Objection thereto which the Court 
responded to, and the matter having gone back to trial on 
June 7, 1988, for the purposes of taking testimony, receipt 
of witnesses as to the value of the farm property and 
personal property, and each of the parties having testified 
in both trials, witnesses having been called, exhibits 
having been offered and received, and the Court being fully 
cognizant ci ciii matters pertaining tnerem, enters cne 
fcllowing: 
1. That the Court finds chat with respect tc the 
Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law which the 
Court signed the 11th of January; 1988, that the Plaintiff's 
objections are overruled and as to the alimony provision, 
the same is allowed to stand as the Court's decision. 
2. In that regard the provision thereof fully re-
flects the Court's conclusion based on the testimony and 
witnesses with the exception of the alimony provision, 
3. That the Proposed Findings of Fact are herein 
restated as previously signed with the modifications that 
the Court finds herein. 
Munn v s . Munns 
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4. That Plaintiff and Defendant were married, one to 
the other, on June 2, 1950, at Logan, Utah, and have been 
residents of Box Elder County, Utah for at least three (3) 
months prior to the filing of the Complaint. 
5. That twelve (12) children have been born as issue 
of the marriage, eleven (11} of which are living. Two (2) 
of said children, Sharla Munns, born May 14, 1972, and 
Sheldon Munns, born September 20, 1975, are minors. 
6. That Defendant is employed full-time at Mcrtcn 
Thiokcl earning an hourly wage cf $12.90 per hour. Thar 
Plaintiff has ncc worked cucside che heme during che car-
riage cue is capable cf employment and has recently worked 
part-time for the schcci district at approximately 33,50 per 
hour. Based upon the Defendant's income, the Uniform Child 
Support Schedule indicates child support should be in the 
amount cf $197.00 per month per child. 
7. That Defendant is currently providing health and 
accident insurance for the Plaintiff and minor children 
through his employment and additionally has life insurance 
on his own life naming the minor children of the parties as 
beneficiaries. 
8. That the Defendant has accumulated approximately 
14 years credit in the Morton Thiokol, Inc., Pension Plan, 
which credit was accrued during the course of the marriage. 
Munr. >JS. Munns 
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9. That each of the parties have received some 
inheritance during the course of the marriage and each 
inheritance appears to have been expended or so co-mingled 
with other marital assets to be unidentifiable. 
10. That the Plaintiff has incurred attorney fees or 
approximately $1,700.00, and the Defendant has incurred 
attorney fees in excess of $2,000.00 in settlement nego-
tiations, discovery, trial preparation and the trial of this 
action. A portion of the Plaintiff's attorneyJs fees was 
paid frcm joint funds accrued during the marriage. 
11. That during the course of the irarriagd, the 
parties have acquired numerous items of real and personal 
property as well as numerous debts. 
12. That the Court in its Memorandum Decision finds 
the following to be the value of the various assets acquired 
by the parties and is set forth as follows, to-wit: 
(a) Family home plus 1.7 acres having a value of 
$30,000.00 with a mortgage of $3,162.00, having a net equity 
of $26,388.00. 
(b) Mobile home and lot - $26,000.00. 
(c) Building lot - $11,000.00. 
(d) Farm valued at $95,500.00, less the mortgage of 
$46,953.00, having a net equity of $48,547.00. 
(e) Vehicles and machinery less loans - $23,859.00. 
Munr. \/s. Munns 
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(f) Junk and scrap metal - $10,000.00. 
(g) Household furnishings - $3,000.00. 
(h) Horses and livestock - $4,000.00. 
(i) Savings account - $3,200.00. 
(j) Chevrolet and Oldsmobile - $350.00. 
13. That during the course of the marriage, the 
parties have incurred debts, to-wit: Mortgage en the 
vehicles - $10,844.52; $796.41 due on the Bronco; $46,953.55 
due on the r^crtgaces en the farm; and S3,612.25 due and 
owina on the ^crtcace en the family heme. 
i - 5 ~° 
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recegnizing the ages o: the children, the eventual receipt 
of social security and retirement benefits together with 
income realized from the properties, the Court finds a 
reasonable sum for alimony is $300.00. 
15. That from the above and foregoing Findings of 
Fact, the Court arrives at the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. That the Plaintiff, Mary Munns, is entitled to a 
Decree of Divorce from the Defendant, Lowell Shelby Munns, 
and the Defendant, Lowell Shelby Munns, is entitled to a 
Decree of Divorce from the Plaintiff, Mary Munns, said 
Munr. vs. Munns 
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divorce to become absolute upon the prior signing and entry 
of the Decree which was January 11, 1988. 
2. That Plaintiff is awarded the care, custody and 
control of the two (2) minor children, to-wit: Sharia 
Munns, born May 14, 19 72, and Sheldon Munns, born September 
20, 1975, subject to the Defendant's right to visit at all 
reasonable times and places. 
3. That Defendant should pay to the Plaintiff the sum 
of $197.00 per month per chile as and for ^uppert, said 
payments are due and payable en the 1st cf ^ach reneh 
ecirmencing wieh the month cf February, il-SS. 
4. That the Defendant shall maintain health and 
accident insurance on the miner children of che parties so 
long as such insurance is available to him through his place 
cf employment, provided however, that each of the parties 
shall be responsible for one-half of any amounts not paid by 
the health insurance. In addition, the Defendant shall be 
obligated to cooperate fully in assisting the Plaintiff in 
obtaining continued health insurance coverage on herself 
pursuant to the Federal COBRA statute and also the State 
legislation. 
5. That the Defendant is ordered to maintain in 
effect the amount of life insurance provided by his employer 
as a fringe benefit and to name the minor children of the 
Munns vs. Munns 
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parties as the beneficiaries of said insurance until such time as 
all children of the parties have obtained majority. 
6. That the Defendant shall pay to the Plaintiff the sum 
of $300.00 a month as and for alimony commencing on the 15th day 
of August, 1988, and is due and payable on the 15th day of each 
month thereafter. 
7. The Defendant's obligation to pay alimony under this 
paragraph will end and he will be released from the obligation of 
payment after the death of either party. Said obligation shall 
likewise terminate upon the remarriage of the Plaintiff or her 
cohabitation with a member of the opposite sex. Said obligation 
in any event shall terminate upon the Plaintiff1s 62nd birthday 
and her eligibility to begin receiving Social Security payments. 
All payments made by the Defendant under this paragraph shall 
be made in cash. 
8. The Plaintiff is awarded one-half interest in all 
retirement benefits accrued in the name of the Defendant in 
the Morton Thiokol, Inc., Pension Plan, up to the date of 
November 124, 1987, which the Court finds to be 14 years of 
marriage while the Defendant was employed at Thiokol. Said 
interest shall be in accordance with the Woodward formula 
and the requirements of Federal regulations governing pension 
plans. A separate "Qualified Domestic Relations Order" 
FINAL FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
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Order" shall be prepared by Plaintiff!s counsel in confor-
mance with Federal requirements and "approved as to form" by 
Defendant's counsel prior to signing by this Court. 
9. That neither of the parties shall receive any 
separate allocation or award of property based upon inheri-
tances claimed to have been received during the course cf 
the marriage. 
10. That the Plaintiff should be awarded the family 
heme, subject to the mortgage, the mobile heme and lea, aha 
building lot, Chevrolet and Oldsmcbile, household furnish-
ings, savings accounts, and $9,000.00 to be paid by a:e 
Cefsndan- ao the Plaintiff to equalize the disaribuaicn :: 
11. That the Defendant: shall receive the farm proper-
ty, subject to the mortgage, the vehicles and machinery 
subject to the debts, the Bronco subject to the debt, junk 
and scrap, horses and livestock, and the Defendant shall be 
required to pay to the Plaintiff the sum of $9,000.00 as 
hereinafter set forth. 
12. That the Plaintiff is granted a judgment against 
the Defendant in the sum of $9,000.00, execution stayed 
thereon pending payment of $4,500.00 within twelve (12) 
months of this date, which is August 1, 1988, and the 
balance of $4,500.00 is to be paid within twelve (12) months 
Munr. vs. Munr.o 
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thereafter, together with interest thereon at the iudcy.T—nt 
rate of 12%. 
13. That the Defendant is to assume and discharge ^he 
debts and obligations identified above with the exception c~ 
the mortgage on the family home, which shall be paid for by 
the Plaintiff. 
14. That each of the parties shall assume and pay 
their own attorney fees and costs. 
•w-*yY.. 
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District Court Judce 
APPROVED AS TC FORM: 
/ < 
BEN H. HADFIELD 
Attorney for Defendant 
ADDENDUM F 
PETE N. VLAHOS, #3337 
VLAHOS, SHARP, WIGHT & WALPOLE 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Legal Forum Building 
2447 Kiesel Avenue 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: (801) 621-2464 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF EOX ELDER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
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This matter having come on regularly for trial en the 
24th day of November, 1987, before the Honorable Gordon J. 
Low, one of the Judges in the above-entitled Court, sitting 
without a jury, and Plaintiff not having rested his case for 
purposes of ascertaining the value of certain real property, 
and the matter having been continued until June 7, 19 88
 f 
before the Honorable Gordon J. Low, for purposes of obtain-
ing further appraisals on personal property variously 
described as "junk", and upon the farm property, and the 
Court having further instructed the parties to present 
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Proposed Findings of Fact, and the Defendant having presented 
Proposed Findings of Fact on January 11, 1988, along with 
Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce, and the Plaintiff 
having filed an Objection thereto which the Court responded to, 
and the matter having gone back to trial on June 7, 1988, for the 
purposes of taking testimony, receipt of witnesses as to the 
value of the farm property and personal property, and each of the 
parties having testified in both trials, witnesses having been 
called, exhibits having been offered and received, and the Court 
being fully cognizant of all matters pertaining thereto, and the 
Court having made its Findings of Facr and Conclusions of Law, 
separately stated in writing. 
NOW, THEREFORE, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the 
Plaintiff, Mary Munns, is hereby granted a Decree of Divorce from 
the Defendant, Lowell Shelly Munns, and the Defendant, Lowell 
Shelly Munns, is hereby granted a Decree of Divorce from the 
Plaintiff, Mary Munns, said divorce to become absolute upon the 
prior signing and entry of the Decree which was January 11, 1988. 
It is further ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
ABSOLUTE DECREE OF DIVORCE 2 
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1. That Plaintiff is awarded the care, custody and 
control of the two (2) minor children, to-wit: Sharla 
Munns, born May 14, 1972, and Sheldon Munns, born September 
20, 1975, subject to the Defendant's right to visit at all 
reasonable times and places. 
2. That Defendant is ordered to pay to the Plaintiff 
the sum of $197.00 per month per child as and for support, 
said payments are due and payable en the 1st of each month 
commencing with the menth of February; 19S3. 
3. That the Defendant is ordered to maintain health 
-~
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so long as such insurance is available to him through his 
place of employment/ provided however, that each of the 
parties shall be responsible for one-half of any amounts net 
paid by the health insurance. In addition, the Defendant is 
ordered to cooperate fully in assisting the Plaintiff in 
obtaining continued health insurance coverage on herself 
pursuant to the Federal COBRA statute and also the State 
legislation. 
4. That the Defendant is ordered to maintain in 
effect the amount of life insurance provided by his employer 
as a fringe benefit and to name the minor children of the 
parties as the beneficiaries of said insurance until such 
time as all children of the parties have obtained majority. 
Munns vs Munns 
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5. That the Defendant is ordered to pay to the Plaintiff 
the sum of $300.00 a month as and for alimony commencing on the 
15th day of August, 1988, and is due and payable on the 15th day 
of each month thereafter. 
6. The Defendant's obligation to pay alimony under this 
paragraph will end and he will be released from the obligation of 
payment after the death of either party. Said obligation in any 
event shall terminate upon the Plaintiff's 62nd birthday and her 
eligibility to begin receiving Social Security payments. Ail 
payments made by the Defendant under this paragraph shall be 
made in cash. 
7. The Plaintiff is awarded a one-half interest in ail 
retirement benefits accrued in the name of the Defendant in 
the Morton Thiokol, Inc. Pension Plan, up to the date of 
November 24, 1987, which the Court finds to be 14 years of 
marriage while the Defendant was employed at Thiokol. Said 
interest shall be in accordance with the Woodward formula 
and the requirements of Federal regulations governing pension 
plans. A separate "Qualified Domestic Relations Order'1 
shall be prepared by Plaintiff's counsel in conformance with 
Federal requirements and "approved as to form" by Defendant's 
counsel prior to signing by this Court. 
ABSOLUTE DECREE OF DIVORCE 4 
Munns vs. Munns 
Civil No. 872020149 
8. That neither of the parties shall receive any separate 
allocation or award of property based upon inheritances claimed 
to have been received during the course of the marriage. 
9. That the Plaintiff is hereby awarded the family home, 
subject to the mortgage, the mobile home and lot, the building 
lot, Chevrolet and Oldsmobile, household furnishings, savings 
account, and $9,000.00 to be paid by the Defendant to the 
Plaintiff to equalize the distribution of the assets as set forth 
in Paragraph 11. 
10. That the Defendant shall receive the farm property, 
subject to the mortgage, the vehicles and machinery subject 
to the debts, the Bronco subject to the debt, junk and scrap, 
horses and livestock, and the Defendant shall be required to 
pay to the Plaintiff the sum of $9,000.00 as hereinafter set 
forth. 
11. That the Plaintiff is granted a judgment against 
the Defendant in the sum of $9,000.00, execution stayed 
thereon pending payment of $4,500.00 within twelve (12) 
months of this date, which is August 1, 198, and the balance 
of $4,500.00 is to be paid within twelve (12) months 
ABSOLUTE DECREE OF DIVORCE 5 
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thereafter, together with interest thereon at the judgment 
rate of 12%. 
12. That the Defendant is ordered to assume and 
discharge the debts and obligations identified above winh 
the exception of the mortgage on the family home, which 
shall be paid for by the Plaintiff. 
13. That each of the parties shall assume and pay 
their own attorney fees and costs. 
DA: this lav or ^ t^ efus4 
—. Vw\-A 
district C< Jucce 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
-7X4 fix Lit 
BEN H. HADFIELD// 
Attorney for Defendant 
ADDENDUM A 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES 
ORDINANACES, AND RULES 
Utah Code Annotated Section 30-3-5(1) MWhen a 
decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it 
equitable orders relating to the children, property, and 
parties. The Court shall include the following in every 
decree of divorce: 
a. An order assigning responsibility for the 
payment of reasonable and necessary medical and dental 
expenses of the dependent children; 
b. if coverage is available at a reasonable cost, 
an order requiring the purchase and maintanence of 
appropriate health, hospital and dental care insurance for 
the dependent children.M 
Utah Code Annotated Section 78-2a-3(2)(h). 
(2) ,fThe Court of Appeals has appellate 
jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of interlocutory 
appeals , over; . . ." 
(h) appeals from District Court involving 
domestic relations cases, including but not limited to 
divorce, annulment, property division, child custody, 
support, visitation, adoption, and paternity ..." 
ADDENDUM G 
' LAW OFFICES 
K E L L Y G. CARDON & A S S O C I A T E S 
0 
All 27TH STREET 
OGDEN, UTAH 84401 
801-627-1110 
XELX-Y G. C A R D O N 
J U D Y D A W N B A R K I N G 
December 12, 1988 
Ben Hadfield, Esq. 
Mann, Hadfield and Thorne 
Zions Bank Building 
98 North Main 
P.O. Box F 
Brigham City, Utah 84302-0906 
Re: Munns vs Munns 
Dear Ben: 
This letter is to advise you that Mrs. Munns has a 
buyer for the Bear River property at a price of $15,900.00. 
Because of the status of the appeal and the property 
therefore being in limbo, I feel it is necessarv that we 
receive your consent to the sale of the property. According 
to the agent and my client the property is quite run .down 
and the price being offered is a fair price for the 
property. In any event, if you do not wish to agree to the 
sale of the property at this price please get something back 
to me in writing indicating so. Thank you for your 
cooperation. 
Very sincerely, 
Keliy G. Cardoj/V^ 
Attorney at Law 
KGC:mjp 
r- r p - u--VENT OF;'HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES 
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION ADDENDUM H 
REPORT OF 
CONFIDENTIAL SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFIT INFORMATION 
Information about a person's Social Security Benefits is confidential by law. Except under certain circumsta.v~ei SDCL•'* z, by 
law and regulations, the Social Security Administration does not reveal such information to any person except ;he ten \ra17 
involved, or his or her authorized representative. 
Beneficiary's name 
and address 
SOCIAL SECURITY CLAIM NUMBER 
PI*I4* 6|tf|9 S 
Mary (Ylu/i/tS 
1. Name of person or agency fror.i A horn 3 
request for benefit information was 
received. 
\%\ Beneficiary 
I | Other (Show name and address) 
The ponon or agency named in item (1) above has requested information about your benefits. The information requestec ''.as 
been provided in the items checked [y) below, and is being sent to you for your convenience. If you want the requesting agency 
(other than yourse'f) to have this information, you may show or send them this official recort. 
2. j j ""-9 gross amount of ycur monthly Social Security benefit Is 
ie amount deducted for Medicare is 
The net amount of your Social Security check each month is 
3. f _ j The above amount became effective 
4^ p—j Y o u r m o n t h l y bene f i t ;Frcrn (month-year) iThrouqn (morun— year; 
L-J (before deduction for Medicare) ; ! 
5. | | The monthly amount of your Supplemental Security Income payment is 
6. r~j The above amount became effective 
7. r~l The total monthly amount of your Social Security benefit and supplemental 
L-J security income payment is 
8. | j According to our records your date of birth is 
•V.onth— rear 
s 
s 
Month —Year 
$ 
M o n t h - D a y - Y e a r 
9. —- We are unable, at this time, to tell you whether benefits may be payable in your case, because the processing of you-
I j claim for disability benefits has not been completed. If it is determined that benefits are payable, you will receive 
notification of the exact amount and effective date. 
10
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\2< 
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SIGNATURE AND TITLE OF AUTHORIZED OFFICIAL 
